Graeme Smith – Above and Beyond

Graeme Smith walked alone through the guard of honour, the applause of the crowd ringing in his ears, and came to the crease for one final time.

The master of the defiant fourth innings would be asked to lead his side to safety one final time and, as he has so often before, took guard, settled his considerable bulk over the bat, jutted out his chiselled chin, and stared back down the pitch, ready as always to take up the challenge.

Just a matter of months ago he had scored a famous 234 to lead his side to victory over Pakistan, yet he had been unable to recapture the feeling throughout this series, dominated by the guile of Harris and the blistering pace of Johnson.

Yet these were distant yesterdays and this was today and only the now would matter to a proud man with a slightly obdurate streak who might have forgotten his form temporarily but not his will to fight.

Harris bustles in and is immediately on the money with a ball that rises from a good length. Smith takes it high on the bat to successfully negotiate the over and to await the fury of Mitchell Johnson that was soon to come.

He only had to wait one ball as his partner takes the single – it’s time for his acid test against Johnson.

Over the years Biff had faced a fair few examinations. He never looked like a guy who would do well in them and yet his report card was one mostly filled with A’s, year after year after year.

One last test to complete and you could hear the sharp intake of breath from the crowd who were willing their hero to his fairy tale finish. Johnson’s arm comes over like a slingshot and the ball is up into his ribs in no time at all. Smith rides the bounces, gets the ball to ground, and scampers three runs.

The relief around the ground is palpable, their belief in their captain unshakeable, their hearts a flutter with admiration. Can Biff perform one final miracle?

Down the other end he watches as Harris traps Petersen in front to claim his 100th Test victim. The task has become harder yet the crowd will continue to believe in fairy tales and miracles – their mighty captain is still there.

Johnson hands his cap to the umpire and walks briskly to the top of his mark. Time almost stands still as he approaches the crease and then suddenly all is a blur.

Over comes the whiplash arm, the ball careening into Smith’s body. He tries to shuffle inside but can only meekly fend it to Doolan in close. Before you could return to your seat from the beer queue the career of one of South Africa’s finest was over.

Smith’s fight was over and it would be left to others to safeguard a mighty legacy against the marauding Australians. In the image of their captain, and with a nod to not so long ago Adelaide, you know they will fight to their last, and their record suggests they can not be written off no matter the odds.

Should they not succeed it will mark their first series defeat since 2009, a period during which they have remained at or near the top of the cricketing tree, having built a side that deserves every consideration as being among the finest of any era.

Far more than his runs, and there were many, this is the legacy that Graeme Craig Smith will leave to his nation, a man who at the tender age of just 22 took the reins of his national side for 109 of his 117 Tests and led them to the summit. No man has led his country in the Test arena on more occasions and none enjoyed more wins than the 52 his teams achieved.

Throughout a storied career he scored runs in all conditions, against all comers at the top of the order, in the process becoming the second most prolific opening batsman in Test history behind the legendary Sunil Gavaskar. To the eye Smith bore a striking similarity to the old Land Rovers so commonly seen on safari across the savannahs of his country – sturdy and powerful with little in the way of aesthetics, devoid of flash accoutrements but immensely reliable and uniquely equipped to handle all manner of going, staring down each challenge and robustly finding a way through. Their slogan, “Above and Beyond”, seems to sum Smith up rather well.

Smith’s journey saw him contribute over 9,000 runs at a high quality average of 48 with 27 centuries thrown in for good measure. Like everything he did it, his batting had a sense of meaning and purpose, each century a robust cornerstone of a victorious push or a successful rear guard stonewalling effort – none came in a losing cause, a symbol of his sheer will to win and ability to survive, and also an indication of the quality of his individual output.

He was always a man of function over form, substance over style with an insatiable will to win which, when this became impossible, drove a desperate determination to avoid defeat. His team contained better stylists, perhaps even better players, but all became imbued with his spirit and relentless desire to make the best of their talent, and a refusal to accept defeat or the impossibility of any challenge. Defeat, when it occasionally came, would be met by honest self-appraisal and learning from mistakes. The response would usually be emphatic and decisive with Smith often leading the charge.

He may not have been able to rouse himself to lead one last charge overnight in Cape Town but his spirit and example will be with the remaining batsmen on the final day as they fight to their last breath to avoid defeat. It is a spirit and attitude that will remain with them not just during the battle today but long after he departs the change room for the last time over the months and years to come.

His record will be about what his has done but his legacy will lie in the culture and team that he has built – something that will withstand the ravages of time and make a far more compelling case for greatness than his batting alone.

Welcome to the pantheon of greats Graeme Smith !

Until next time … that is stumps.

It’s Legs Eleven at the Souk

In a souk under the blazing Dubai sun a cacophony of raised voices and shouted demands cuts through the early morning silence as officials of Full member nations continue their unedifying daily haggling with the stall holders of the BCCI, ECB and CA around the future of the ICC and the structure of world cricket. It is a scene that has been seen often over the past week since formal meetings began to discuss the draft FC&A position paper, and each day has brought us fresh news of the latest peripheral accommodation sold in exchange for their vote.

In today’s latest update from the horse-trading at the souk we receive news of a fresh proposal to facilitate the possibility of top Associate members attaining Test status. You might recall that just a few short days ago that a promotion and relegation system was suggested under which there would be two tiers of Test cricket, one involving the top 8 Full members and a lower level that accommodated Zimbabwe, Bangladesh and the top 6 Associate nations who would play in an Intercontinental Cup.

The winner of this competition would earn the right to challenge the lowest ranked nation from the top-tier for promotion to the top flight over a 4 match series with the victor being elevated, or remaining, in the top-tier – that is unless one of the bottom ranked teams were the rich merchants of the BCCI, ECB or CA who were unilaterally exempted from such market forces in order to protect their business interests and without whom it was argued the souk would fall into financial ruin.

As an encouragement for the development of cricket in leading Associate nations the proposal had some merit as well as providing continued incentive for those in the top flight to maintain and enhance standards. Naturally self-interest and the now familiar horse-trading at the souk saw the proposal quickly jettisoned given that the stall holders required the support of Zimbabwe and Bangladesh to advance their broader financial agenda.

The latest negotiations have resulted in a new proposal that would provide the leading Associate nation with the opportunity to challenge the lowest ranked Test nation to a series, victory in which would award them Test status for the following four year period – naturally, given their previous accommodations, the stall holders have assured Full members that their Test status will not be affected regardless of the result. “Legs eleven” cries the bingo caller at the souk!

Again, it is not a bad proposal if the aim is to provide clearer pathways for leading Associates, but it remains eerily silent, as was its earlier incarnation, on the broader implications of such a decision.

The first, and most important, issue it ignores is the very clear link between Test status and Full membership of the ICC with all of the financial and voting rights it brings. As the ICC website makes clear in its Members Overview section:

“Full Members are the governing bodies for cricket of a country recognised by the ICC, or countries associated for cricket purposes, or a geographical area, from which representative teams are qualified to play official Test matches.”

It goes on to note in their section ICC Classification of Official Cricket (with effect from January 2014) that:

“Test matches are those which:

  1. a.      are played in accordance with the ICC Standard Test Match Playing Conditions and other ICC regulations pertaining to Test matches; and
  2. b.      are between:

                                            I.            teams selected by Full Members of the ICC as representatives of the Member Countries (Full Member Teams)

                                          II.            a Full Member and a composite team selected by the ICC as representative of the best players from the rest of the world … “

And yet under this proposal from the Dubai souk there appears to be no suggestion that should the top ranked Associate would attain Full member status should they defeat the bottom ranked Test nation. This should really come as no surprise given the narrowing of financial and governance power to the BCCI, ECB and CA articulated even under the latest modification of the FC&A proposal – after all such status would create an additional, albeit much disembodied, voice and vote at the ICC table, not to mention reducing the distributions (after Contribution Cost) to each Full member by around $5.7m over the next 8 rights year cycle based on realistic ICC revenue projections of $2.5b.

This is the real elephant in the room – Test status confers Full membership rights and it does so because those that attain it meet a set of criteria (see here for details) that demonstrate their financial stability, the sustainability and strength of cricket in their nation or region, and their ability to grow the game. In return they are entitled to a greater share of ICC revenue and decision-making power as a Full member.

It is clear that historically this criteria has not always been consistently applied by the present incarnation of the ICC, Bangladesh for example had neither a FC structure at the time of their introduction or a sustained period of dominance at lower levels. Nor does it appear that members are regularly reviewed against it as Zimbabwe lurch from one disaster to another over the past decade as a corrupt government and compliant cricket administration burn piles of ICC cash and reduce player numbers and programmes to the point where have been unable to afford to participate in Test cricket and pay their players on several occasions.

But past failings of governance should not mean that such criteria are not relevant into the future. If the new proposal emanating from the souk is adopted, Associates can attain Test status without the need to meet a set of criteria that, if sensibly and objectively measured, ensures that they continue to invest in cricket infrastructure, participation and playing strength. Equally though, such participation may impede their ascension to Full membership – new nations have historically struggled to be immediately competitive and this may colour judgement over Full membership applications as the strength is no longer purely assessed against performance at lower levels.

In addition, if the FC&A document can be believed, the successful Associate would experience an additional financial impost by having to host unprofitable tours of which this position paper would have us believe there are many and without the additional ICC revenue derived from Full membership, and with no guarantees of bilateral series against the Big 3 would they really be better off?

And then of course, with potentially another Test nation added, there is the problematic question of how to create a realistic FTP with meaningful Test series length when scheduling issues and the lust for financial returns cannot see such a dream realised in the present day with less nations to accommodate.

Realistically, if it is desirable to ensure that “Test cricket remains competitive and relevant” and have each nation play each other on a home and away basis every four years with each series having a minimum of 3 Tests, it is hard to find a way in which this could work with more than 9 teams given that this would result in each playing 6 to 8 Tests each domestic summer – after all it is hard to have a fair and realistic ranking system without a workable FTP.

A greater number of teams will simply result in either more meaningless two Test series, or less frequent (or potentially no) bilateral tours to smaller Full members from the largest three nations which would further erode the already fragile financial position of many given the almost certain introduction of the Contribution Cost model over the next rights cycle.

However, as Srini, Giles and Wally board their magic carpet en route to the Burj Al Arab, weary from another day of frenzied bargaining at the souk that brings them ever closer to their goal, you can rest assured that they will waste not one minute’s contemplation on such difficult issues – after all they are not particularly germane or helpful to their broader agenda.

Tomorrow will undoubtedly be another frantic day at the souk bringing more breathless news of new deals, alliances and accommodations but it is unlikely to supply the answer to this problem.

Until the market opens tomorrow … that is stumps.

The Beginning of the Reckoning

“This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless, by a supreme recovery of moral health … we arise again and take our stand for freedom …”

Winston Churchill uttered these words in the House of Commons in 1938, just a few days after the then British PM, Neville Chamberlain, stepped from plane clutching the now infamous Munich Agreement in his hand with the proud boast that “I have returned … with peace for our time”.

Perhaps we could substitute Chamberlain for Alan Isaac, the ICC Chairman who has just received a draft proposal, hatched in secret by the BCCI, ECB and CA under the auspices of a ‘working group’ of the ICC Finance and Commercial Affairs (FC&A) Committee, a report that seeks to “address the significant challenges to the viability of cricket” for an ICC that has “lost touch with the issues Members face in sustaining the growth of cricket in their markets”.

In return for greater control over the ICC and a greater share of its revenues this already powerful triumvirate assert that their plan will:

  • ensure that “Test cricket remains competitive and relevant”;
  • “re-energise nation versus nation cricket while recognising the permanent place in cricket for certain major domestic events”;
  • make “the financial position of a number of the Full, Associate and Affiliate members sustainable”;
  • ensure a “fair distribution of revenues, recognising the contribution of each member to the ICC both on and off the field”;
  • ensure “sufficient and appropriate support” for Associate and Affiliate members;
  • establish an idealstructure for the ICC; and
  • “streamline bilateral arrangements to ensure relevance to ICC events and the viability of the game in relevant markets”.

You could be forgiven for stretching the earlier historical allusion a little further and think of the institutions and finances of the ICC as a modern day Sudetenland with these three powerful boards as the Axis powers – the more acerbic among you might even be moved to attribute the monikers of Mein Fuhrer, Il Duce and Fimimaro Konoe to their leaders.

Perhaps this goes slightly too far, but it is certainly no exaggeration to say that the final outcome of discussions and negotiations over coming weeks will be of critical import to the game, not just in the immediate future, but likely for decades to come.

At stake is the “democratic character of the … Constitution … First they ask [people] to agree to the establishment of a protective system including taxes … and secondly they ask that the Lords shall be granted not merely the veto they have used so freely over legislation but a hereditary veto over finance as well”.

But, as the speaker Winston Churchill, went on to say over a century ago in a debate over extending the powers of the House of Lords, “it is not merely a question of rejection of the Budget … but the claim of a … Chamber over which you have no control, which may be civil to you if it likes, but which if it chooses to cut up rusty is altogether beyond the reach of your remonstrations … They are matters of vital and striking importance …”

Churchill could just as easily have been commenting on the FC&A draft proposal that, when stripped of its shiny facade, seeks to concentrate the powers and revenues of the ICC into the hands of its authors via the introduction of an all-powerful new Executive Committee (ExCo) and the concept of a Contribution Cost that would be applied against all ICC revenue, essentially providing an exceptionally uneven commission structure to Full members.

The proposed ExCo would consist of a permanent representative from each of the BCCI, ECB and CA together with a representative from one other Full member nation, with the wide remit of being the sole recommendation committee to the ICC Board on all constitutional, personnel, integrity, ethics, development, nomination and revenue distribution matters.

Effectively, proposals from any of the other 8 ICC committees will require ExCo support before they are presented to the Board, consisting as it does of the 10 Full members, 3 Associates, CEO, Vice President and Chair.

It is unclear how the introduction of a committee that effectively concentrates decision making into the hands of just three ICC members and which actively restricts the diversity of voices and opinions heard by the Board remains consistent with the aim of the ‘working group’ in ensuring that “the ICC reverts to being a member-driven organisation; an organisation of the members and for the members”.

Equally baffling is the way in which the FC&A proposal seeks to fulfil its objectives of making ‘the financial position of a number of the Full, Associate and Affiliate members sustainable” and ensuring that Associate and Affiliate members receive “sufficient and appropriate support” by developing and advocating a Contribution Cost model that effectively takes millions of dollars of potential future income away from them and diverts it into the hands of the 3 wealthiest members, in particular the BCCI.

Although it is presented as a mechanism to recognise “the role of each Member in contributing to generating the ICC revenues required to sustain the game” and the “Member’s contribution to the ICC in terms of history and how the members has performed on the field over the past 20 years in both men and women competitions”, in reality it is nothing more than a glorified commission payment based on some mysterious, unseen formula that attributes income to its source in terms of the broadcast rights agreements.

Based on revised, and lower, budgets for ICC administration and event costs, a number of high level  projections are presented in the FC&A proposal, the detailed calculations of which can be found in Attachment 1 ICC.

In my opinion the most likely scenario is that the 2015-2023 rights cycle will deliver the ICC revenues of around $2.5b which represents a 66% increase over the 2007-2015 cycle despite two fewer events being held. Under this scenario, the proposed Contribution Cost model delivers the BCCI a $445.9m windfall compared with the current distribution methodology, while the ECB and CA reap $49.7m and $7.3m respectively.

The remaining 7 Full member nations each receive between $27m to $57m less revenue across this 8 year period under the proposed methodology, although the elimination of member subscriptions would save each between $7.2m to $9.6m. At the same time $200m in total is stripped from Associates and Affiliates, although this is likely partially offset by eliminating member subscriptions ($41m between 2007-15) and compensatory increases to the ICC events budget to fund A&A events ($53.5m funded from distributions between 2007-15).

It is proposed that half of the A&A total will be allocated to the top 6 Associates to accelerate their progress and development. No doubt this will please these nations greatly as it would represent a significant increase to their current level of ICC funding but it is impossible to escape the conclusion the growth and participation in the sport outside of the top 16 nations may be slowed due to lower funding.

The magnitude of the funding gap for each membership category will ultimately depend upon the ICC revenues attained and the scale of the disparities obviously increases in line with higher revenues – I have constructed a complete financial summary in Attachment 2 ICC.

What is clear is that other than redistributing revenue to those that need it least the introduction of the Contribution Cost serves no other ostensible purpose other than to appease the BCCI who have long grumbled about the lack of recognition, and presumably reward, they receive for generating a significant proportion of the revenues in world cricket, both at an ICC and bilateral level.

And what exactly has world cricket gained in return for recognising this special contribution? The answer is even less than they had before with the albeit flawed FTP to be scrapped in favour of bilateral arrangements that provide no assurance that India will even complete full tours of all Full member nations, tours which could offset the loss of ICC revenue distributions or even surpass this figure; no end to the farce of 2 Test series; and the loss of Bangladesh and Zimbabwe from the Test playing ranks.

For a proposal that, in the minds of some commentators, has been a necessary pact with the devil in order to save Test cricket it does very little to achieve that outcome, notwithstanding the creation of a Test Cricket Fund that only takes effect at the uppermost (in my mind) revenue point likely to be achieved in the next cycle, and the creation of a vehicle to enable top ranked Associates, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh to return to the Test ranks via a promotion and relegation system that exempts the Big 3 in perpetuity from the chop.

However, even Churchill was a pragmatist, famously striking deals during times of crisis that would not otherwise be contemplated, and I can’t but help think that this, albeit significantly flawed FC&A proposal, allows an opportunity to create a workable path forward that:

  1. improves the financial stability of a number of Full member nations;
  2. provides a workable and binding FTP calendar that allows for a full programme of Test and ODI bilateral series on a home and away basis;
  3. provides meaningful bilateral Test series with context; and
  4. provides a clear pathway for advancement for the top level of Associate nations

Much of world cricket, whether it likes it or not, is dependent upon the revenues that India brings to the table, both at national and ICC levels, and India is the only nation, blessed as it is with a huge population (bigger than the other 9 Full members combined) and increasing wealth, that could successfully afford to adopt the American sporting model and place primacy on its domestic IPL competition over international contests given its latest bumper profit of approximately $61m USD.

Without the audience that India brings to bilateral contests, particularly in the Test arena, and to ICC contests, I fear that the game will become more unaffordable for an increasing number of nations and the growth of the game could stagnate in both new and existing regions. Already we are seeing many nations prioritise the scheduling of shorter forms of the game over Tests because they generate a greater return, especially when for some, visits by cricket’s Big 3 are either sporadic, truncated or do not happen at all.

The starting point for my way forward is a recognition that, as unpalatable as it may be, real change cannot occur without an accommodation of India’s position regarding revenue re-distribution but this does not require new committees like ExCo that seek to concentrate power in the hands of a few and silence the voices of other members, nor anything more than clearly agreed and monitored budgets and expense management protocols that maximise the return to all members and for which the ICC executive is accountable to the members for.

Clearly any proposal that means a reduction in the current funds received by members cannot be countenanced and on this basis I would propose to apply no Contribution Cost calculation applies to the $1.5b figure, representing as it does the current revenue and funding position. From that point forward I have adopted this methodology, albeit it at a lower and more sensible rate.

Based on the likely ICC revenue figure of $2.5b, the BCCI would now receive additional revenue of $312.1m compared to the current distribution methodology while the ECB and CA would receive $34.7m and $5.1m respectively. Distributions to the remaining 7 Full member nations would fall by between $19.3m to $40.2m (offset by $7.2m to $9.6m in membership fee savings) across this 8 year period, an improved result from the FC&A proposal and one which nonetheless delivers greater overall funding than received at present. Detailed revised calculations are provided in Attachment 3 ICC and Attachment 4 ICC.

In return all nations, including the BCCI, ECB and CA, will need to agree to a contractually binding FTP schedule that provides for home and away series (with a minimum of 3 Tests and 5 ODIs) between all Full members in each 4 year period , with the financial gain provided by consistent and regular tours by the Big 3, and India in particular, allowing the reduced ICC revenue distribution to be offset at worst.

This can only be achieved, using a basic capacity of 6 home Tests per summer, with a maximum of 9 teams and as such I would propose that Zimbabwe lose its full membership and Test status, the two in my mind being intrinsically linked. This 1/10th share of Full member funding should be reallocated equally between seed funding for the Test Cricket Fund prior to the $2.5b revenue threshold and the now top 7 Associates.

I realise this is a radical step but Zimbabwe have not been a competitive nation for almost a decade, have demonstrated for many reasons that they cannot manage their affairs or funding appropriately, and to be brutally honest have limited growth and revenue prospects compared to others based on their unstable political situation, small population and their medium-term economic prospects.

As proposed in the FC&A document, the top 7 Associates will play in an Intercontinental Cup with the top ranked nation earning the opportunity to challenge the 9th placed Test nation for promotion. This will provide a clear and relevant path for advancement of Associates but the outcome of the contest should also be linked to the attainment (or loss) of Full membership rights with no nations exempted – after all if the Big 3, with all the financial resources and infrastructure available to them, cannot avoid what would be a most unlikely relegation then they deserve their fate.

There have been countless pieces written on this proposal since it was unearthed a few days ago, far too many to mention individually, and this is but another. Each contribute to an understanding of today’s cricketing landscape and a rigorous examination of the issues attached to the proposal, but beyond that few offer a concrete way forward that is rooted in the reality of cricket’s present situation.

I have tried to do that here and whether you agree or disagree I would love to hear your thoughts on the matter – at the end of the day we all love the game and want it to prosper, even if we have different ways of achieving that end.

Until next time … that is stumps.

Crossing the Rubicon – The BCCI’s Continued Grab For Power

In 49BC Julius Caesar stood with his troops on the northern bank of the Rubicon River, the geographic border between the Roman province of Cisalpine Gaul and Italy proper which was controlled by Rome and its allies.

He faced a decision of some historic, political and personal importance because under the laws of the day he, and his men, would be committing a capital offence by crossing the river into the territory of Rome with the certainty sparking armed conflict as a result.

After some reflection and contemplation Caesar is reported to have uttered “alea iacta est” or loosely translated, “the die is cast”, before setting out with his men across the river.

In doing so he shattered the convention of the age, flouted the law, and gave rise to the adage of “crossing the Rubicon” which has come to refer to any person or group committing themselves irrevocably to a risky or revolutionary course of action, often called in the modern parlance “the point of no return”.

Cricket today faces a similar moment of historic significance with news filtering through of the BCCI’s latest attempt to assert its financial hegemony over much of the international cricket landscape via an audacious bid to secure a greater share of the spoils generated from ICC tournaments.

Under the current arrangements the ICC redistributes 75% of the profits from tournaments such as the Champions Trophy, World Cup and World T20 Cup to in equal measure to the 10 full member nations, with the remaining 25% allocated to funding the further development of the game among associate member nations.

Not satisfied by corrupting the Future Tours Programme with its malevolent vengeance against CSA and its CEO Haroon Lorgat, its unilateral refusal to implement the Wolfe Report and adopt DRS, and in ensuring the schedule of world cricket is bent to accommodate the needs of the IPL and the profits it generates for a small group of its cronies, members of the BCCI, led by its iron-fisted dictator, the infamous Narayanaswami Srinivasan, are now furiously lobbying that the vast Indian domestic audience and broadcast rights deals it generates entitle it to a larger share of the spoils.

Although it would appear to run completely counter to the interests of all other nations, history suggests that the financial hegemony the BCCI exercises over many of the full member nations, in particular Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, West Indies and Bangladesh, means the audacious cash grab has a realistic prospect of success, which will both further cement their hold and have serious implications for the growth of the game among associate member nations.

In 49BC the Roman consuls failed to take action and fled in fear of Caesar and his victory resulted in the law and convention of imperium never being enforced then or into the future.

Should other member nations and the rather toothless ICC fail to observe the lessons from history the consequences for the game, both for its future development and current strength, could be calamitous.

It is indeed a Rubicon moment for the game and should the members nations fail to recognise its long-term consequences I fear that Caesar’s words will be prophetic – alea iacta est, the die is cast.

Until next time … that is stumps.

It’s All Greek to Me – The Ostracism of Haroon Lorgat

It has been nearly six weeks since I brought you news of the shameful shenanigans and malevolent vengeance endangering India’s highly anticipated tour of South Africa – if you missed it the first time around have a look at How do you Like Them Crab Apples in the archive section.

There has been little to report since then aside from the deafening sounds of silence followed by an unnerving static of rumour and innuendo but, if recent media reports can be believed, it would appear that a deal to save the tour has finally been reached following a meeting between the BCCI’s infamous Narayanaswami Srinivasan and CSA’s Chairman, Chris Nenzani.

The reported tour of two Tests and either three T20I matches or three ODIs to be confirmed following the BCCI Board meeting on October 26 represents a financial disaster for CSA who stand to lose approximately $19.9m USD in revenue as a result of the shortened tour, but considerably less than the crippling $49.8m USD at risk had the tour not gone ahead at all.

Obviously cognisant of this financial catch-22, and perhaps even more acutely of the underlying reasons at the heart of the BCCI’s artfully crafted piece of bastardry, Nenzani extended more than an olive branch and a persuasive argument when he met Srinivasan last week in a desperate attempt to salvage the tour.

According to Cricinfo one of the conditions demanded in return for the tour proceeding was that the man at the centre of the enmity, Haroon Lorgat, have no part at all in it. However, once bitten and twice shy, Nenzani was also reported to have offered to “send Lorgat on long leave” and that CSA “would be working out a plan before the end of the tour to ensure Lorgat is not involved in future dealings with the BCCI”.

I suppose it isn’t quite the grovelling apology sought from a prostrate Haroon Lorgat, nor was it his complete removal, but it comes pretty close with Nenzani’s Faustian pact having more than a passing nod to ancient Greek history in its reintroduction of the practice of ostracism to high cricketing life.

Ostracism was introduced to ancient Athens in around 580BC as a response to almost a century of warring between rival noble families that saw murders and entire families being permanently banished from the city, leading in turn to a never-ending cycle of further retaliatory violence and counter expulsion.

At its heart ostracism transferred power from the noble families to the citizens of Athens who were given the power to decide who should go and who should stay via a vote whereby they would scratch the name of candidate for expulsion onto an ostracon or potsherd.  

If a candidate received more than 6,000 votes they were asked to leave Athens for ten years, after which they could return, and to encourage them to accept the decision peacefully they were permitted to retain their property and any income accumulated from it.

The system provided a clever means of ending the never-ending cycle of conflict between the noble elites of the city but it did not take long for it to be abused for political advantage, so much so that anyone targeted could be ostracised, whether they were a threat to the peacefulness of the city or not. Themistocles, the city’s leader from 493BC, was particularly adept in using the process for political advantage and he successfully cast a number of prominent rivals from the city, only to finally receive a taste of his own medicine around 470BC.

Obviously Chris Nenzani forgot to read the last few pages and missed seeing how the story ended!

But people in South Africa’s cricketing fraternity are starting to notice, with journalist Telford Vice reporting of a schism emerging among the board of CSA over the Nenzani’s handling of the matter with five members against his ‘compromise’ and six in support, including the Chairman himself.

No doubt many are asking how their CEO can be an effective representative and agent for South African cricket when he has been withdrawn from ever dealing with cricket’s most powerful group, the BCCI, presumably even at the ICC level?

Perhaps some are contemplating why, despite the obvious warnings of retribution from the BCCI, they appointed Lorgat in the first place?

Maybe they are wondering whether having made a stand for principle and independent governance only to suffer a loss of $19.9m USD as the BCCI extracts its artful revenge, how much face is lost or saved by Nenzani’s ostracism of Lorgat?

Or maybe they are wondering how cricket in South Africa can survive if the alternative is no tour at all and a further $30m USD drop in revenue, combined perhaps with their very own future ostracism from the lucrative ownership of the Champions League?

Is it really better to die on your feet than die on your knees? Or is that the other way around?

Perhaps it’s just all Greek to you, me and them?

Until next time….that is stumps.

How the West was Lost – Why did the WACA Really Lose its Crown ?

Due to the squeeze created by the 2015 World Cup, Australian fans face an unusually sparse fare of Test cricket in 2014/15 with just four Tests against the visiting Indians finding their way onto the crowded cricketing schedule.

The unfortunate upshot was that one of the nation’s traditional Test venues would miss out on the honour and financial benefit of hosting a match for the first time since the WACA’s debut in the 1970/71 season.

After considering submissions from the QLD, WA and SA state cricket associations, CA announced on Wednesday that the WACA would be the unlucky venue to miss out, a decision likely to cost the association between $3m and $5m according to its chief executive Christina Matthews.

It is also a decision likely to cost CA’s broadcast partner Channel Nine anywhere between $4.8m and $7.5m in lost prime-time advertising revenue[i], but true to their earlier boast, the needs of the broadcaster proved not to have sway over CA scheduling decisions.

CA’s decision is rooted in a desire to safeguard the best interests and health of the game along with some very sound commercial reasons, however they are not necessarily the ones that you might think.

In most quarters the decision has been presented as a simple financial one involving issues of attendances and ground capacity, but the facts suggest that the primary reasons lie elsewhere.

As a starting point let’s examine attendance and capacity data, excluding Ashes Tests, since the 2007/08 season as captured in the table below:

Adelaide Oval

Gabba

WACA

Total attendance[ii]

373,489

218,440

189,202[iii]

Days used[iv]

23

18

14

Attendance p/day

16,239

12,135

13,514

Capacity

36,000

42,000

22,000

% of capacity

45.11%

28.89%

61.43%

What this data clearly shows is that, outside of the Ashes, none of the venues comes close to filling its capacity. History suggests that this would still be the case against the Indians in 2014/15 and as such I don’t believe that capacity carries real significance in the decision-making process.

Surprisingly the table also shows that the Gabba is the worst attended of the venues over this period, despite Australia’s enviable 25 year unbeaten Test record at the venue. Even last year versus South Africa in a battle for the number one ranking, the average daily attendances were 15,393 at the WACA; 14,661 at Adelaide; and 12,522 at the Gabba.[v]

Given the strength of its attendances and South Australian state government’s $535m investment in its redevelopment, it should be fairly obvious that the Adelaide Oval ranked highest of the venues under consideration and that the decision became a shoot out between the Gabba and the WACA.

If the decision was really just all about attendances and capacity, Perth might have emerged as a narrow victor, but there were also other factors at work.

Peter Lalor was one of the few journalists or commentators to suggest at the time the World Cup draw was announced that the WACA would be the venue to miss out, and today in The Australian newspaper, he revealed that QLD Cricket has experienced significant financial problems and had recently been forced to renegotiate terms to repay a rental debt it owed to the Gabba stadium.

Losing a Test is a significant financial hit to any state association due to the loss of gate receipts, but for QLD Cricket it would be even more calamitous for two reasons. The first is that unlike the WACA, they lease the Gabba and would likely have to pay compensation for failing to provide an expected fixture, and more importantly, they could not be compensated by additional ODI and T20I matches as the Gabba falls within the security lockdown zone created due to Brisbane’s hosting of the G20 summit.

This is the real driving force behind CA’s decision and on balance, taking all factors into account, they have made a call that is in the overall best interests of the game in a difficult set of circumstances, and they should be congratulated for it – albeit that their explanation requires further elaboration.

At the same time there is an intriguing subtext behind all of this.

As cricket in Australia becomes increasingly corporatised the present drama could provide a glimpse into a future where CA adopt a similar approach to the ECB’s and have pre-qualified venues apply based on a range of criteria for the right to host international matches.

In an era where drop-in pitches have allowed greater diversity in use for traditional cricket venues, they also enable other venues, such as Stadium Australia in Sydney and Patterson’s Stadium in Perth, the opportunity to leverage their superior facilities or capacity to wrest games away from traditional venues.

In particular this is a concern for the WACA, especially with regards to capacity and media facilities, and perhaps it will provide a much-needed catalyst towards commencing work on a long-discussed and mooted redevelopment of the ground.

However, there is also a message for the good people of Brisbane. You have a great ground with great facilities that provides an excellent starting point for the summer of cricket but these natural advantages might mean little if you don’t start getting to the Tests in greater numbers outside Ashes years.

I may be wrong but I sense at least some of you can foresee the possibility of such a future – in any event don’t say you haven’t been warned.

Until next time….that is stumps.

 

 

 


[i] Based on prime time rate of $25,000 per 30 sec slot as per Channel Nine rate card. Calculations based on 38 slots per last session (conservative) and 12 min p/hour advertising component (aggressive). All analysis based on a session of 2.5 hours duration.

[ii] Attendance figures sourced from state annual reports, Cricinfo and Aus Stadiums. Last day figures excluded where minimal play.

[iii] Figures do not include day 4 of Aus vs SA in 2012 and no attendance figures for Aus vs Ind 2008 as no figures available through any sources

[iv] Exclude days rained out (Aus vs SA at Gabba in 2012), and last days where minimal play involved

[v] Refer to previous notes for exclusions and limitations

How do you Like Them Crab Apples? CSA’s Catch-22 With the BCCI

From the moment in July that CSA dared to defy the protests and solicitations of the BCCI by appointing the former CEO of the ICC, Haroon Lorgat, to their vacant CEO post you sensed this moment would come, an artfully executed act of revenge against a Board that refused to kowtow to their unreasonable interference, and a man who had famously clashed with them on several issues including the Future Tours Programme, DRS, and the Wolfe Report into governance.

In July CSA announced a tour by India comprising of 2 T20 internationals, 7 one-day internationals and 3 Tests commencing on 21 November and finishing on 19 January, providing a financial bonanza for CSA and a much anticipated contest for their fans.

Sadly this mouth-watering contest appears set to be greatly curtailed with media reports emerging from the recent BCCI Working Committee suggesting that the BCCI will now present CSA with a much slimmer proposed itinerary of 2 Tests, 3 one-day internationals and just 2 Tests in a move that will cost CSA approximately $14.7m USD according to respected South African commentator Neil Manthorp.

Cricinfo reported an (always) unnamed BCCI official as saying:

“Our priority is to look after the interests of our players and the Board … And such a long tour wasn’t viable from either perspective. We need to space out tours so that cricketers get much needed breaks between them”.

Seemingly nothing wrong with that right? Well, as the saying goes, actions speak louder than words and it is in their actions that the BCCI reveals its malevolent thirst for revenge.

Following their recent meeting the BCCI Working Committee confirmed a tour of New Zealand starting on 19 January comprising 5 one-day internationals and 2 Tests, while also offering a new and unexpected invitation to the West Indies to tour in November for what has now been confirmed as a series of 3 one-day internationals and 2 Tests, a tour that can only commence after the ODI series against Australia concludes on 2 November.

So I ask you dear reader, are such actions consistent with the comments of the unnamed BCCI official noted above in ensuring adequate rest periods for the players or is it more consistent with the actions of a group of individuals wishing to financially damage the interests of CSA and perhaps embarrass its newly appointed CEO?

Artfully the BCCI, who have stated that they had never agreed to the itinerary announced by CSA, find themselves in a position where they are unfortunately forced to offer an inferior counter-proposal to ensure that the tour goes ahead at all.

It is an act of bastardry artful in its elegance and execution, strangely reminiscent of a scene from Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 where Orr tells Yossarian:

“I did it to protect my good reputation in case anyone ever caught me walking around with crab apples in my cheeks. With rubber balls in my hand I could deny there were crab apples in my cheeks. Every time someone asked me why I was walking around with crab apples in my cheeks, I’d just open my hands and show them it was rubber balls I was walking around with not crab apples, and that they were in my hands, not my cheeks.”

Well how do you like them crab apples Hoorat?

After all, as Heller goes on to note his fabulous critique of bureaucratic operation and reasoning:

“Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can’t stop them from doing”.

And the sad fact of the matter is that CSA can, and will, do very little in response to such a terrible and pernicious slight and the significant financial impact it will have on them as they are caught in a real life catch-22.

Perhaps they could refuse permission for their players to participate in the IPL, however the importance of this income to their players, plus the fact that they receive 10% of the player’s salaries as a participation bounty, makes it unlikely they would adopt such an act of principle.

Equally, it is almost unimaginable that, as some have postulated, they would withdraw their teams from participating in the Champions League tournament. After all CSA presently own 20% of the enterprise which, as reported in India Today, netted them $2.3m USD in profits in 2011 along with a share (together with CA) of $7.4m USD in participation fees.

Both areas provide significant and recurring income to CSA and perhaps, as a not so subtle reminder of this fact, reports are now strategically filtering through from those unnamed BCCI sources of rumours that the BCCI are considering terminating CSA’s ownership stake in the Champions League.

So how do you like them crab apples Hoorat?

Choose to withdraw permission for your teams and players to participate in the IPL and Champions League and you lose even more financially both over the short and longer term, or cancel the tour as a matter of principle and turn a financial disappointment into a disaster, with all possible suitable replacements already committed during this period.

It truly is a real life catch-22 isn’t it? Perhaps as Heller notes in his novel:

“…’it’s better to die on ones feet than live on one’s knees’, Nately retorted with triumphant and lofty conviction. ‘I guess you’ve heard that saying before’. ‘Yes, I certainly have’ mused the treacherous old man, smiling again. ‘But I’m afraid you have it backward. It is better to live on one’s feet than die on one’s knees. That is the way the saying goes’. ‘Are you sure?’ Nately asked with sober confusion. ‘It seems to make more sense my way’. ‘No, it makes more sense my way. Ask your friends.’

And so we ask the ICC and full-member Boards that very question – just don’t hold your breath waiting for a response.

After all, as Chaplain Tappmann came to realise:

“… in a moment of divine intuition, the handy technique of protective rationalisation, and he was exhilarated by his discovery. It was miraculous. It was almost no trick at all, he saw, to turn vice into virtue and slander into truth, impotence into abstinence, arrogance into humility, plunder into philanthropy, thievery into honour, blasphemy into wisdom, brutality into patriotism, and sadism into justice. Anybody could do it; it required no brains at all. It merely required no character”.

Until next time, that is stumps.

Requiem for a Dream – Australian Cricket on the Second Anniversary of the Argus Review

Yesterday marked the second anniversary of the much anticipated Argus Review of Australian cricket.

Written in the aftermath of successive Ashes defeats, both at home and away, it was heralded as a roadmap back to success for the national team in light of:

  • the Test team only winning 5 of its last 11 series, the majority of which came against lower ranked sides;
  • the ICC Test ranking of the team slipping from first to fifth;
  • the failure of the top 6 batsmen to consistently perform;
  • substandard bowling returns against leading teams with few bowlers beating a benchmark of 30 runs per wicket; and
  • the elimination of the ODI team in the quarter-finals of the 2011 World Cup, the worst result since 1992.[i]

The panel identified several factors as central to this decline, namely:

  • poor performances by leading players;
  • poor basic skills of the players;
  • confusing selections;
  • inadequate succession planning;
  • format and scheduling of pathway competitions;
  • a need to retain experienced players in Grade cricket;
  • poor team culture; and
  • a lack of structural accountability for such issues and team performance in general[ii]

Two years on it is clear that, at least for now, the review has been an abject failure with the majority of key indicators and causes showing little by way of improvement:

  • the Test team is currently ranked fourth on the ICC Rankings and will fall to fifth should they be defeated at The Oval;
  • Australia have won 4 of 8 series , none against a higher ranked opponent at the time, while winning 12 of 28 Tests and losing 10;
  • the Test team have not tasted victory in its past 8 Tests, including 7 defeats;
  • only 5 of the 11 batsmen used average greater than 35 during this period;
  • the batting unit has failed to reach 250 in 13 separate completed innings;
  • the team is now on its third coach in less than 3 years;
  • the captain has withdrawn from his role as selector, recognising that, as was obvious at the time, such responsibility ran counter to his role in maintaining sustainable and trusting relationships with his players;
  • the ODI team were eliminated without winning a match at the Champions Trophy tournament and have won just 21 of 43 matches; and
  • 49 different players have represented Australia across all 3 formats of the game, including 30 in Tests.

In many ways the past two years remind me of the cult indie movie Requiem for a Dream where a motley collection of flawed and lonely characters fall into various forms of addiction which lead to them being imprisoned in a world of delusion and reckless desperation that is subsequently overtaken by their harsh reality.

Certainly there can be little doubt of the bleak reality currently facing Australian cricket, with a pervading stench of inevitable defeat hovering around it reminiscent of the dire days of the mid-1980s.

What follows is an attempt to break down some of the commonly held theories in an attempt to find discover who or what is to blame and whether there is any way to fix these matters.

Selection & Rotation

In the two years since the Argus Review, Australia have used 30 players in 28 Tests, a number higher than  all other full member nations (excluding Zimbabwe and Bangladesh from the analysis).

A number of commentators have argued that this selection merry-go-round has been a significant factor behind Australia’s decline. However, an examination of results for all nations over this two year period does not show a strong correlation between selection consistency and success:

Nation Tests Played Players Used Loss % Ave Changes Per Test
New Zealand

20

26

55.00%

0.79

Sri Lanka

21

25

42.86%

0.70

Australia

28

30

35.71%

0.70

India

17

25

35.29%

0.88

West Indies

17

23

35.29%

0.75

England

24

21

29.17%

0.43

Pakistan

15

23

26.67%

0.86

South Africa

19

19

10.53%

0.44

Table 1 – Correlation between Team Success & Number of Players Used [iii]

Perhaps more interesting are the statistics before and after Australia’s epic draw against South Africa in Adelaide just 9 short months ago:

Performance   Category

Pre   Adelaide Nov 2012

Post   Adelaide Nov 2012

Matches

16

12

Wins

9

3

Losses

2

8

Draws

5

1

Batting – ave/wkt

36.76

30.30

Bowling – ave/wkt

27.08

33.93

Centuries scored

22

5

5WI taken

11

9

Sub 200 batting totals

3

4

200-250 batting totals

1

5

Table 2 – Comparison of Team Performance Indicators Pre & Post Adelaide Test Nov 2012[iv]

Coming into the Perth Test match Australia were just a solitary victory away from claiming the ICC number one Test Ranking and had enjoyed the better of both the earlier drawn contests. Amazingly, in Ricky Ponting’s final Test, and with the prospect of far easier assignments ahead against Sri Lanka, Australia’s selectors chose an entirely different seam bowling attack from the previous Test and were rewarded by South Africa romping to a comprehensive victory.

It was the first significant manifestation of the infamous ‘informed player management’ policy and marked a significant departure in building a strong team performance culture.

Indeed it would not be too harsh to say that it was the day that Australia went to a gun fight and forgot to bring any bullets.

Since that watershed moment the team’s performance both on and off the field has gone into freefall barring a brief respite at home against the hopelessly outgunned Sri Lankans. The happenings at Perth sent a message that performance was not the sole criteria for selection – indeed excellence could be rewarded by a match on the sideline, while no performance of note was needed to force one’s way into the line up.

If you think this is too strong a critique consider for a moment the following examples.

Mitchell Starc captured five wickets in the second innings at Hobart against Sri Lanka only to be rewarded by having a childhood dream of playing in a Boxing Day Test ripped away under the spurious guise ‘injury prevention’. Nathan Lyon also captured career best figures of 7/94 against India in the final Test of that disastrous tour only to miss selection for Australia’s next two Tests in favour of a young man with just 10 FC matches to his credit.

Then there is the astonishing case of Rob Quiney who, despite his moderate Shield performances that summer, was selected to bat at number 3 against the might of the South Africans. Although he made perhaps the greatest 9 on debut in the history of the game, he was passed over for the better credentialed Phil Hughes for the Tests against the Sri Lankans. It emerged later that he was used as a crash test dummy  to insulate Hughes’ fragile confidence and technique from Steyn and co with the hope of parachuting him into a successful third coming as a Test batsman.

The stunning coup de grace came with the unfathomable selections of Glenn Maxwell and Xavier Doherty for the tour of India despite their lowly FC bowling records. Even more astonishingly they were actually preferred over the incumbent Nathan Lyon for a Test, despite his generally solid record and recent performances.

Is it any wonder then that the past nine months, in which Australia have added nine new players via the selection chocolate wheel, have seen a series of careworn and undisciplined performances on the field, particularly among the batsmen, and increasingly scandalous happenings off it?

A once successful culture has been broken and it will take time and steadfast resolve to fix it.

Thankfully Darren Lehmann has started talking a language and walking a talk in recent Tests that all players and supporters can understand, which is that runs and wickets are the only currency that matters, and that opportunities when granted must be taken.

The 4 P’s – Participation, Player Talent, Pitches and Pathways

Ed Smith, a far better writer than your humble correspondent, wrote of suggesting prior to the 2010/11 Ashes series that:

“the pillars of Australian excellence – club cricket, state cricket, and a hard-bitten unified cricketing culture that ran through their game at all levels – had crumbled. One firm push and the citadel might fall.”[v]

Russell Marks adopted a similar line in a recent Cricinfo piece examining the structural reasons behind Michael Clarke being the only world class batsman Australia has produced who was born after 1980.

At the heart of his theory is a belief that the pathways of Australian cricket, with their emphasis on early talent identification in age teams and bunches of players marching as one through these development groups, has created a soft underbelly and sense of entitlement that has been detrimental to maintaining high standards in FC and Test cricket.[vi]

Using as a reference point the 100 players selected in Australian U19 squads for the biennial World Cup tournament since 2000, let’s examine the success rate in turning these talented youngsters into hardened Test and FC cricketers:

U19 World Cup Player Conversion Rates

Chart 1 – Historical Conversion Rates of U19 World Cup Players to International & FC Cricket [vii]

Overall 20% of this group has played Test cricket, however with each passing year the conversion rate to International and FC cricket is declining.

It is not just a natural lag factor. Given that historically most of these players will make their FC debut within two years of this event, the following chart demonstrates declining quality as measured by an annualised average number of matches per player (across the total population):

Annualised FC & International Appearance by U19 Reps

Chart 2 – Annualised International & FC Appearances for U19 World Cup Representatives by year of Representation[viii]

A full list of representatives and statistics appears here (Australian U19 World Cup Teams Analysis).

The declining standard of players emerging from established pathways is also impacting on the overall quality of FC cricket in Australia, especially when coupled with a spectacular own-goal by CA’s administrators in creating the Futures League in 2009.

For the uninitiated, The Futures League was created to replace the old 2nd XI state format. Driven largely by a belief that the current structure was inhibiting the development and pathways for talented 19 to 23 year olds, it introduced shortened 3 day matches with a maximum of 96 overs for each first innings and 48 overs for each second innings.

Following the Argus Review and the negative opinions expressed during its consultation process[ix], Cricket Australia made significant changes to the format of the competition in 2011 by reverting to a four day format, removing the overs restrictions, and increasing the number of players aged over 23 from three to six.

Nonetheless, as former FC players Dirk Nannes and Theo Doropoulos have argued in recent articles, with vocal support from many current players on Twitter, the damage was, and continues to be done.

The creation of the Futures League has caused a significant deterioration in the standard of the Sheffield Shield as preparation for Test cricket by creating an artificial experience gap as younger players are expected to develop in a cosseted microcosm bearing little resemblance to the furnace of FC and International cricket without the hardened wisdom of senior players or dog-eat-dog competition for their place.[x]

All you proof you need is found in the dramatic deterioration in key performance metrics across the Sheffield Shield since the introduction of the Futures League in the 2009/10 season:

Shield Stats

Chart 3 – Key Sheffield Shield Performance Metrics by Season[xi]

It is all very well to identify talented youngsters and create pathways for their coaching and development, however history demonstrates that the greatest success comes when this is coupled with rigorous competition for places at every level.

CA should start the long road back to rebuilding the cricketing fabric and culture by immediately scrapping the Futures League and reverting back to a genuine 2nd XI competition where performances in Grade cricket dictate selection rather than a spurious quota system that the evidence shows has little impact in assisting the truly talented and determined find their way to the top echelons of the sport.

Pathways remain important however, especially as overall senior participation remains an issue for the game and its future success.

Recent CA Annual Reports [xii] loudly proclaim the success of their participation programmes, supported by their annual Census that demonstrate a growth in participation from 436,325 in 2002/03 to 880,291 participants in 2011/12.

They are impressive numbers but beneath the surface lies more sobering news for the future, at least for the senior men’s team, because the data shows that much of this growth is inflated by the inclusion of indoor cricket competitions, coupled with significant increases in the number of women and junior players.

No doubt this is welcome news for the suits and accountants at CA who trumpet such figures as barometers of success and tools in negotiating media rights and sponsorships via such insights as cricket participants are 8X more likely to attend a cricket match, and 4X more likely to watch a cricket match on television.[xiii]

However, analysis of the participation data over the past four years suggests that although great commercial success might be likely as a result, there is a gap between increased junior participation, fuelled by successful modified formats and timings, and declining senior and club numbers.

2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Type of Participation
Total Participants 604933 804100 850155 880291
Total Outdoor 604933 651871 662364 682109
Male 532348 564284 560019 560485
Female 72585 87587 102345 121624
11 a side club comps 309080 326813 317309 304085
Modified club comps 8434 10723 7608 9451
11 a side school comps 131511 133434 121174 106048
Modified school comps 85551 83545 88993 99196
in2CRICKET 70357 97356 127279 163329
Cricket clubs 4085 4010 3990 3820
Club & school teams 39151 41403 39441 38700
Indoor cricket N/A 152229 187791 198182
Senior N/A 113399 128771 136549
13 to 18 N/A 8954 26839 38445
5 to 12 N/A 8019 32181 23188

Table 3 – Cricket Participation Rates 2008 to 2012[xiv]

While CA have made excellent progress in boosting junior numbers these programmes will take some years to reach fruition and will require careful management because only by translating to senior participation can they ever viewed a success in pure cricketing, rather than commercial terms.

Before closing this examination of the 4P’s it is worth examining the role and impact of pitches on the decline in FC performance metrics. As Chart 3 above demonstrates, there has been only a marginal increase in draws in the Sheffield Shield over the past 3 years, so perhaps a generic condemnation of the standard of FC pitches is a little too simplistic cause of the decline.

Although they might not be greatly impacting the number of results in Sheffield Shield cricket, most would agree that pitches in Australia are changing in their character. Gone is the traditional pace and bounce of Perth, and the renowned turn of Adelaide and Sydney. Perhaps this is an unintended outcome of the amount of AFL played at major venues which allow reduced time for pitch preparation and lead to a greater preponderance of ‘drop-in’ wickets, as well as increased use of Grade standard pitches, especially in NSW.

As a result perhaps the performances of Cape Town and in India could be seen through the prism of younger players having little exposure to even moderately similar conditions at home.

It might perhaps be beneficial for CA to consider increasing the number of purpose-designed cricket venues, especially during the early months of the season to allow proper time to prepare more characteristic wickets at the major venues.

Accountability

At the end of the day it is inescapable, based on the empirical and anecdotal evidence, that Australian cricket has been in decline for many years and that the early results following the Argus Review sadly show no signs of this being reversed in the near future.

Some of the causes could have been avoided with better and more forward-thinking management, and indeed some were entirely self-inflicted as a result of decisions made by the CEO and the Board. Surprisingly few have yet called into question and demanded accountability from the CEO who has presided throughout the period and made many of the decisions or recommendations for change.

James Sutherland has done brilliantly in growing the game’s finances, both for its development and to better reward the players. Revenue from continuing operations (including gates, media rights and sponsors) has grown to $260m, cash reserves to fund future initiatives are growing, and junior participation is increasing strongly. The new domestic broadcast rights deal signed this year will add a further $43m per annum to this pot.

Yet, as Ricky Ponting simply states:

“… we must remember that the success of this business will be measured by the success of the national team.”[xv]

Surely should the unthinkable occur and Australia fail to regain the Ashes at home, the time must come for James Sutherland to resign, or be forced aside, from the post he has held since July 2001.

It would also provide an opportune moment to review the role and performance of Pat Howard as High Performance Manager. As the man in charge of the coach, captain, Chairman of the NSP, and Centre of Excellence Manager, he wields significant influence, and while some issues pre-date his tenure the recent examples of poor team behaviour, insipid performance, reported fractures within the team environment and culture have occurred on his watch.

One of the cornerstones of the Argus Report was the need for clear objectives and performance metrics for people to be held to account against. On any objective measure, Howard should be nervously anticipating a day of reckoning that must surely come and which might actually result in a well qualified cricket person such as Belinda Clark to assume his role.

Of course such apocalyptic measures will mean that Australia has lost the Ashes again. I desperately hope that this horror does not eventuate however given  the side  has not recorded a single International victory in any format since February, there is a very real prospect that by Sydney in 2014 Australia will not have tasted victory in 31 successive matches against full member nations.

In the movie that gives rise to the title of this piece, Requiem for a Dream, each character at the end of the movie curls into the foetal position and imagines their dream coming true. The movie ends with their successful selves reuniting on a television studio floor to the cheers of the crowd under the bright stage lights.

Unfortunately their reality was wretchedly different, much the same as our post-Argus present.

Anyway, happy second anniversary to you Don and your esteemed panel.

Until next time that is stumps.


[i] Australian Team Performance Review Summary Report (aka The Argus Review) p. 6

[ii] Australian Team Performance Review Summary Report (aka The Argus Review) pp. 8, 29

[iii] Data sourced from various Cricinfo statistics queries

[iv] Data sourced from various Cricinfo statistics queries

[v] Ed Smith – “Australia : hubris, despair, panic” – http://www.espncricinfo.com/magazine/content/story/654535.html

[vi] Russell Marks – “What Ails the Clarke Generation?” – http://www.espncricinfo.com/thestands/content/story/654727.html

[vii] Data sourced from various Cricinfo statistics queries and articles

[viii] Data sourced from various Cricinfo statistics queries and articles

[ix] Australian Team Performance Review Summary Report (aka The Argus Review) p. 28

[x] Australian Team Performance Review Summary Report (aka The Argus Review) pp. 28,29; Dirk Nannes – “The Experience Gap” – http://www.alloutcricket.com/blogs/comment/nannes-the-experience-gap ; Theo Doropoulos – http://theodrop.tumblr.com/

[xi] Data sourced from various Cricinfo statistics queries

[xii] CA Annual Reports 2010-2012

[xiii] Australian Cricket Roadshow – slide 20 (contained in 2011/12 CA Annual Report)

[xiv] National Cricket Census 2011/12 pp. 7-10; www.cricket.com.au/useful-links/australian-cricket-census

[xv] Daniel Brettig – “Ponting attacks CA’s BBL hype” – http://www.espncricinfo.com/the-ashes-2013/content/story/654537.html

The Alistair Cook Effect – Does Captaincy Allow You to Soar Like an Eagle or is it an Albatross Around Your Neck ?

Recently England’s young captain, Alistair Cook, reached his 25th Test century, the most ever by a player representing the three lions of the ECB.

At just 28 years of age it is an outstanding achievement and there has certainly been much speculation and discussion around what place he might assume among the pantheon of greats once his career finishes.

Undoubtedly he will finish as his nation’s highest run scorer and century maker, and who knows, with good luck, form and health he might just surpass Sachin’s formidable tally, notwithstanding the great man’s refusal to acknowledge the appropriate time to go in a way reminiscent of the machinations of his own Board president.

However, what has really struck me is the remarkable output of runs and centuries Cook has enjoyed as captain. It reminded me of a quote from management and leadership expert Mike Myatt who once said “few can comprehend the heavy burden of leadership until it rests squarely upon their shoulders.”

It got me wondering about the effect Test captaincy has had on the performances of its recipients over the years because it is perhaps the most challenging on-field leadership role of any sport.

Essentially this is because there are two parts to it, captaincy and leadership. The captaincy piece is the most familiar to us as spectators; the naming of the batting order, the bowling changes and field placings; all of which can significantly change the course of a match. Then there is the equally important, but mostly unseen, aspect involving leadership off the field; coaching, managing personalities, setting standards and the like, not to mention the significantly increased media requirements of the modern age.

It is a weighty responsibility and one that has seen some of its holders soar like an eagle in terms of their personal contribution, but equally it has proven to be an albatross around the neck of many.

This piece is an attempt to find the eagles and the albatrosses by examining comparing the batting records of a group of international Test captains and comparing their personal output both as captain and as an ordinary member of the team.

I have selected batting as the prism through which to examine the question because there is no other discipline that so nakedly exposes a player in terms of their desire, fighting qualities and talent – after all it really is you against the other eleven at all times.

A qualifying mark of 1,000 runs scored as captain was set to ensure a statistically valid number of innings and basis of comparison, resulting in an illustrious group of 78 making the final cut – most are batsmen, some are all-rounders, with a few bowlers thrown in for good measure. A full list appears here Captaincy Effect.

Players are rated in terms of the percentage of performance difference which interestingly shows that among this group, 45 enjoyed a better average when captain, 8 were roughly equivalent within a 5% degree of variance, and the performances of the remaining 25 deteriorated by greater than 5% worse while they were captain.

So anyway, without further ado I present the list of captaincy eagles and albatrosses.

SOARING LIKE AN EAGLE

As seen above, statistically players appear to be more likely to thrive than not under the burden of captaincy, however some certainly soared higher than others. In reverse order here are the top 10.

10) Peter May (England)

Only Michael Vaughan and Andrew Strauss have led England on more occasions than Peter May, a very accomplished and stylish player, who scored a century on debut and was a pivotal team member and captain during a very successful era for his nation.

However, it was upon assuming the reins of the captaincy that May’s batting truly took off. In 41 Tests as captain, May averaged an outstanding 54.03 and notched a century once in every 6.50 appearances at the crease. This compares extremely favourably with his record across his other 25 appearances, in which he managed just 3 centuries (one in every 13.67 innings) at a rather more pedestrian average of 36.42.

9) Alistair Cook (England)

Alistair Cook was already an accomplished opening batsman prior to taking over the captaincy, scoring over 6,000 runs in 81 Tests at a very acceptable average of 46.36 with 18 centuries at a rate of one in almost every 8 innings.

However, since taking over the mantle from Andrew Strauss, Cook has been absolutely prolific, matched perhaps only by Australia’s Michael Clarke.

In just 11 Tests as captain, Cook has already notched up an amazing 7 centuries, at the unbelievable rate of one every 3 innings – in fact, he has converted EVERY score over 50 in this period into a century, and generally a game changing one.

It is perhaps not surprising that his average while holding the reins is a remarkable 69.00, and it is this rich vein of form since assuming the role that has seen him confidently predicted as England’s all time leading run scorer and century maker, not to mention an outside chance of surpassing Sachin’s formidable records in each of these categories.

8) Daniel Vettori (New Zealand)

I can still remember the young man who strode determinedly to the crease at number 11 against the Aussies on debut. Never in my wildest dreams could I have ever imagined him scoring a Test century, let alone being labelled as a genuine all-rounder, but such is the power of persistence, determination and lest it be said, the captaincy effect.

In 32 Tests as captain, Vettori averaged a very respectable 39.12, often batting as high as number 6, and racking up 4 very valuable centuries at a rate of one every 14 innings. Although his numbers are a little skewed by his early lack of prowess, they clearly illustrate the power the captaincy had upon his powers of concentration and leading by example – just 2 centuries in 119 innings at a rather more modest average of 25.73.

7) Bob Simpson (Australia)

Bob Simpson is well known as one half of one of Australia’s most successful opening pairings along with his more famous partner, Bill Lawry, during the 1960s, as well as being the man who, as coach, helped return Australia back to the top of the heap in partnership with Allan Border during the latter part of the 1980s.

The other little known fact about Simpson is that he is Australia’s most successful member of the captaincy eagles, a fact made even more remarkable by the fact that a quarter of these games came after his 41st birthday when he returned to lead his nation during the WSC years after an absence of 9 years from Test cricket.

It is truly remarkable that Simpson never scored a Test century until he assumed the Test captaincy, his other 23 appearances resulting in just 11 half-centuries at the Ed Cowan-like average of 33.67.

In fact, Simpson didn’t score a Test match century until his 30th Test, breaking through with a remarkable 311 at Old Trafford in 1964, a year in which he scored a then record 1,381 runs in the calendar year.

Once he had made the breakthrough, Simpson as captain, grew wings as a batsman averaging an outstanding 54.07 in 39 Tests as leader, including 10 centuries at a rate of one every 7.10 innings. Even more remarkably, 2 of these were scored during his return to the game after a 9 year hiatus.

6) Misbah-ul-Haq (Pakistan)

Although I would not seek to put Misbah in the same class as Simpson in terms of quality, the elixir of the captaincy has had a similar effect upon his batting with his captaincy average of 54.26 comparing rather favourably to the meagre 33.60 achieved for the rest of his career.

Much of this can be attributed to the responsibility of the leadership as he reined in his free-wheeling approach and concentrated on setting an example to his mercurial teammates. It is an approach that has yielded just the one century, however he has passed fifty on a further 14 occasions in just 34 innings, including a high proportion of not out scores.

5) Graham Gooch (England)

Goochy currently holds an honoured place as his nation’s highest ever run scorer, although I suspect it is an honour he will not hold past Alistair Cook’s 30th birthday.

That not withstanding he was a pretty handy slipper and opening bat across 118 Tests for his country, but I wonder how much better his numbers might have been had he discovered the captaincy caper earlier ?

Gooch led from the front recognising that what he did would set a tone for the rest of his side and the match, and giving them perhaps more purpose than they had shown for a decade.

As captain Gooch scored 11 centuries at the rate of one every 5.76 innings, a considerable improvement from his output in his other 84 Tests where he managed just 9, raising his bat just once in every 16.89 innings.

I am sure you will not be surprised to see a considerable difference in his averages as well. In his 34 Tests as captain Goochy averaged an outstanding 58.72 to stand like a colossus over his teammates, a figure so far removed from the 35.93 he averaged across the rest of his career that you might easily describe him as the protagonist in Jekyll and Hyde.

4) Ray Illingworth (England)

Although he could hardly be described as a genuine all-rounder, Illingworth often batted at 6 or 7 in the order with a fierce determination not to give away his wicket.

He was highly rated as a strategist and captain by Ian Chappell and certainly he tried to set an example through his personal performance about the discipline and focus he expected from his players.

As captain Illingworth averaged a respectable 28.62 over 31 Tests, scoring 2 valuable centuries and 4 fifties, contrasting rather favourably with his meagre output from his remaining 30 Tests where he managed to average just 16.11 with just a solitary 50 to his name.

3) Trevor Goddard (South Africa)

Having come to the captaincy almost by default, and leading a team derided by the press as no-hopers, Goddard famously led his nation to a drawn series against Australia in 1963-4.

He was regarded as a fine all-rounder, however when looking through his career I can not but help but think that it was his ascension to the leadership that provided the necessary impetus to his batting performances that enabled him to be described in this manner.

In the 28 Tests he played without the captaincy, Goddard averaged just 27.92, failing to notch a century despite reaching 50 on 9 occasions. However as captain his output soared as he racked up 1,092 runs in just 13 Tests and a very handy average of 49.63, scoring a century and a further 9 half-centuries, matching his previous output in under half the games.

2) Imran Khan (Pakistan)

The “Lion of Lahore” is without doubt Pakistan’s most influential player and in my mind their best, although Wasim Akram could make a case.  Regardless of where you sit on this question, I don’t think there can be much argument with the fact that Imran is one of the greats of any era as either an all-rounder or purely as a bowler.

Imran was an inspirational captain and a man whose sensational efforts made his team a genuine and consistent international force. And he just got better as he went on – just think that in his final decade of Test cricket he averaged around 50 with the bat and 19 with the ball across 51 Tests, considerably better than his career record in either discipline, and considerably better than any of the great all-rounders to have played the game.

Almost all of this excellence came during his time as captain and it was his batting that became emblematic of the change in his approach as he went from a moderately talented but inconsistent player averaging 25.43 with just one century in 40 Tests, to a man who could (and sometimes did) command a place as a specialist batsman alone.

His record as captain in 48 Tests was phenomenal as he averaged 52.34 (more than twice as good as his previous output) with 5 centuries and there is no doubt that the captaincy allowed this lion to soar like an eagle.

1) Heath Streak (Zimbabwe)

Perhaps a surprising top performer in the eagles category, but Streak would appear to have emerged from much the same mould as Imran in terms of the impact captaincy had upon his personal performance.

Although Zimbabwe were undoubtedly a far stronger outfit than today’s motley crew, Streak’s personal performance had much to do with this as he transformed himself into a genuine all-rounder capable of making an impact in both disciplines.

Again the batting is an excellent barometer with Streak averaging a very competent 36.17 as captain in 21 Tests, along the way scoring his only Test century and a further 7 scores over 50. disappointing 16.01 across 44 Tests with just 4 half-centuries. It contrasts extremely favourably with his far more meagre output in his remaining 44 Tests which saw just 4 half-centuries at the less than flattering average of 16.01.

AN ALBATROSS AROUND THEIR NECKS

And now it’s time to look at the flip side of the coin, at those for whom captaincy was a heavy albatross around their neck, dragging down their personal effectiveness as batsmen, and their overall records.

10) Mark Taylor (Australia)

‘Tubby’ is regarded as one of Australia’s best post-war captains; aggressive, tactically astute and diplomatic; and a man who guided the nascent careers of many of Australia’s golden generation.

He was also a quite accomplished opening batsman, but one who struggled to maintain his previous standards while bearing the burden of leading his nation, so much so that it was only a memorable century at Edgbaston in 1997 that saved his career following a barren period of 18 months without a Test century.

You can easily see this struggle reflected in his numbers – as captain ‘Tubby’ averaged just 39.63 with only 7 centuries at a rate of one every 12.71 innings, compared to his record of 12 centuries (one in every 8.08 innings) at a far more impressive average of 46.97 without the burden of leadership.

9) Sir Vivian Richards (West Indies)

Viv was one of THE great players, one who was very much a favourite of mine for his swagger, batting bravado and crushing strokes, however he was not immune from succumbing to some degree to the weight of the captaincy albatross.

As captain, Viv averaged a creditable 45.11 with 6 centuries at a rate of one every 12.33 innings. They are decent numbers but a far cry from those performances of earlier years which have seen him rightly labelled as a great of the game – 18 centuries at an average of 53.64, with a raising of the bat once in every 6 innings.

8) Sourav Ganguly (India)

I was genuinely shocked at his inclusion in this list as Ganguly always looked up for the challenge and seemed to relish the role, but it just goes to show that appearances can be deceiving.

Ganguly captained his country on 49 occasions and averaged just 37.66 with 5 centuries at a rate of one in every 15 innings. These numbers are certainly far removed from the rest of his career record where he scored another 11 centuries (one in every 10.27 innings) in 64 Tests at 45.15, an average much more in keeping with his level of talent.

7) Nawab of Pataudi Jnr (India)

His appearance might perhaps be a slight anomaly due to the fact that like Graeme Smith, he captained his nation for the majority of his career as a Test player but in his 40 Tests as leader he averaged just 34.14 compared to his first 6 Tests without the responsibility where he averaged a far more impressive 41.00.

6) Rahul Dravid (India)

Yes, that’s three Indians in a row which might say a bit for the unique pressures that come with the captaincy of such a populous and cricket-mad nation.

As one of the great batsmen in history, I am pleased that Dravid realised relatively promptly the detrimental impact that the captaincy was having upon his performance and that his nation might be better served if he concentrated on his primary role of scoring runs.

Dravid captained India just 25 times during his illustrious career but, weighed down by the burden of leadership, he could only manage 4 centuries (one in every 11.25 innings) at a far more mortal average of 44.51.

Contrasted against his record in 139 Tests without the captaincy where he averaged a stellar 53.73 with 32 centuries at a rate of one every 7.53 innings, it is hard not to come to the same conclusion that the great man himself did – captaincy was negatively affecting his performance.

5) Lord Colin Cowdrey (England)

Cowdrey was a giant of the English game, at one stage or another holding many of their records for Test batting, and indeed on the all-time list.

His inclusion is therefore surprising and perhaps owes more to circumstance and age than the burdens of leadership.

Cowdrey assumed the captaincy following an injury to Peter May and proved immediately successful with England undefeated in his first 10 Tests until Lords in 1961. May resumed the captaincy upon his return but it was commonly believed that it would revert to Cowdrey in the foreseeable future.

After choosing not to tour Pakistan in 1961-62, the captaincy went to Ted Dexter and for the next 5 or so years there was considerable conjecture around whether Cowdrey should assume the role in preference to Dexter and then Smith.

So through an unfortunate mixture of circumstance and politics it was not until 1966, when there were few alternatives and was into his mid-30s that Cowdrey again took the reins as captain, at an age much nearer to retirement than the continuing rigours of Test cricket.

In such circumstances it could be argued that his average of just 38.11 was due more to age than pressure, but it is worth remembering that close to half of his 27 appearances as captain came during his pomp, rather than his final years, and that he scored 6 centuries at a rate per innings vastly superior to the games in which he was not captain.

On balance I think it remains fair to look at his record across his other 87 Tests where he scored 14 centuries at an impressive average of 46.16, and make the argument that the captaincy had some negative effect, perhaps unsurprising given the circumstances of the period that led to him assuming the role.

4) Bill Woodfull (Australia)

Woodfull is perhaps best known as Australia’s leader during the Bodyline series but he was a very fine batsman, one who held a great many records at Sheffield Shield level in particular.

This level of quality is certainly reflected in his early career record where, unburdened by the leadership, he averaged 53.13 in 10 Tests with 5 centuries at a phenomenal rate of one every 3.20 innings.

As captain his record reverted from outstanding to merely good as he recorded just 2 centuries in 25 Tests at a far more moderate average of 42.94, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that captaincy may not have aided his personal performance.

3) Mushtaq Mohammad (Pakistan)

Mushtaq was a very fine player, perhaps generously described as an all-rounder despite the fact that his leg spin was shamefully under-utilised at Test level.

He captained his country in a third of his appearances but failed to shine as a batsman in them, averaging just 33.38 in 19 Tests with just 3 centuries. Without the leadership, Mushtaq performed far more creditably in his other 38 Tests notching 7 centuries at a much more acceptable average of 42.06 for a front-line batsman.

2) Richie Richardson (West Indies)

Richie Richardson was a very stylish player, a man seen as a miniature Viv, both in approach and appearance with his steadfast refusal to adopt protective headwear.

It would be fairly safe to say that this is generally where the comparison should end – Richie was no Viv in terms of his record – however, they share one important trait, and that is their flair and performance appeared to be significantly impacted by the burden of leading their team.

As captain in 24 Tests, Richardson managed just 2 centuries at a modest average of 35.18, a result in no way reflective of his ability – just take a look at his record in his other 62 appearances where he scored 14 centuries (one in every 7.64 innings) at a far more impressive average of 47.90.

1) Michael Vaughan (England)

For all of his recent merciless baiting of Australia, it gives me great pleasure to announce Michael Vaughan as the man who laboured under the burden of the captaincy the most.

I am sure that as the man who famously orchestrated the return of the Ashes after 16 long years of Australian dominance he probably doesn’t much care – in fact most England fans would probably agree with him.

There can be little doubt of his outstanding man-management qualities and the vast improvement in the fortunes of English cricket it brought about, however it came at a personal cost to his run-making ability.

No longer was he the batsman who scored 900 runs in just 7 Tests against Sri Lanka and India in 2002, nor the batsman who stood alone as a beacon of hope with over 600 runs during yet another failed Ashes bid in 2002/03, a man who in 31 Tests scored 9 centuries and averaged a tremendous 50.98.

Instead we saw a tremendous captain but one shorn of his batting profligacy, a man who could only average 36.02 in 51 Tests with just 9 centuries.

As I said, he will probably not care, and neither will England fans for his place in their sporting folklore is secure, but with a huge battle for the Ashes coming up, it is a fitting way to end this piece.

Until next time … that is stumps.

From Packer to Modi and Srinivasan – The ‘Crowd’ Changing World Cricket

In 1975 Kerry Packer was just one of millions around the world who sat transfixed by broadcasts of the first World Cup ODI tournament in England. The drama and quality of the play was what stuck in the minds of most fans, but for the wealthy Packer it also sparked in his mind the seeds of an idea for a significant commercial opportunity for his television station.

With its natural advertising breaks and strong supporter base, cricket seemed to him a natural and profitable fit with his network, and Packer became determined to wrest the broadcast rights away from the national public broadcaster, the ABC.

Having had his advances so emphatically rejected by the Australian Cricket Board, Packer took the commercially brave, and revolutionary step of establishing his own international competition, secretly signing much of the world’s cricketing elite and tapping into their undercurrent of discontent resulting from low pay and lack of appreciation from their respective cricket Boards.

Thus, in 1977, World Series Cricket was born in direct competition to the establishment game.

Having shorn the cricketing world of the cream of its elite players, and most importantly their crowds, the Packer revolution was remarkably successful and within just two short seasons, a rapprochement (or some might say surrender treaty) was brokered with the ACB, and having secured the long-term broadcast and marketing rights to the game in Australia, Kerry released the players from his employ and returned them to their national teams.

Although normal service in terms of the cricket might have resumed, aspects of the game and most particularly the way it was administered had changed forever.

In a cricketing sense, although he certainly did not invent the form, Packer further popularised ODI cricket and made it a part of the cricketing mainstream by increasing its appeal to spectators at the ground, and more importantly to the viewers at home, through innovations such as the 50 over format, coloured clothing with player’s names on it, night cricket and the white ball that enabled it, and fielding restrictions aimed at increasing the number of boundaries.

However, far more importantly, Packer changed the way in which the game was administered forever as the elected amateur officials of the ACB were quickly supplanted by individuals and groups whose cultural capital came from legal, media and business interests rather than the game itself.

It was perhaps unsurprising then that the first ‘post war’ act of the ACB was to postpone the scheduled tour of India and allow a further series of lucrative ODIs between Australia, England and the West Indies.  For a Board financially weakened by the WSC conflict this may have been pragmatic and sensible, but there can be little doubt of Packer’s unseen influence at hand as he sought to generate profits not only for his television network, but also for his specially created marketing vehicle charged with promoting the game.

The famous English cricket writer Neville Cardus famously held in an essay that crowds matter in cricket. It has largely always been the case, and particularly from the late 1800’s the literature is replete with references to private and national tours planned and staged with the aim of attracting the largest crowds and the profit motive firmly in mind.

Certainly it was the huge crowds and viewing audience that WSC attracted in its second season (especially when contrasted with those of the establishment cricket) that swung the battle and advantage towards Packer in the late 1970’s.

It was a poignant reminder of the importance of the crowd, but it was a crowd very different to that of Cardus’ time, numbering not just those who came through the turnstiles, but also the vast unseen masses huddled in front of their television screens at home.

Indeed over time it has become this vast unseen home audience that has largely become the ‘crowd’, and it is this ‘crowd’, accessed only through broadcasters who pay ever-increasing sums for the privilege, that is shaping the financial landscape of cricket, and with it the power dynamics at play.

India is one of the most populous nations on earth, a nation whose love for the game of cricket is perhaps unsurpassed. Over the past decade or so a fortunate confluence of social and economic factors; increasing globalisation, the expansion of new and traditional media in all its forms, and the rapid growth of the Indian economy and emergence of a rising middle class; have provided the framework necessary to unlock the monetary value of this passion.

Like Packer, Lalit Modi and N. Srinivasan, did not invent T20 cricket, but they capitalised upon this confluence of social and economic factors via the BCCI to popularise the game and make it part of the sporting mainstream via the IPL. By any measure it has been a spectacular financial success with the combined purchase price of the nine current franchises totalling $1.145B, broadcast rights attracting revenue of $1.6B over 10 years, sponsorship revenues of well over $50m annually, and an estimated brand value for the competition of almost $4B.

In many ways it is the logical culmination of the revolution started by Packer – just on steroids and with a far more nakedly shown nexus between the Board and its commercial interests, as demonstrated in the inherent conflict of having as chairman of the BCCI the owner of the IPL franchise, the Chennai Super Kings.

However, nothing could demonstrate the fact that crowds matter so emphatically and the commercial opportunities available to the game via the vast Indian broadcast audience than the IPL, and it has made tours by the Indian team the hottest and most valuable in the game, with rival Boards captive to the rivers of gold that they provide.

If you don’t believe me take for instance the case of Cricket Australia. In their Annual Report 2011/12, CA reported revenues of $260M for the year, up some $96M from the previous season, a fact almost solely attributed to the increase in broadcasting rights revenue arising from India’s tour of Australia.

Now if the power of the Indian crowd can make such a marked difference to the fortunes of a stable and successful Board such as CA, imagine for a moment the impact such a tour would have on the fortunes of less financially robust cricketing nations such as Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the West Indies ?

It is therefore little wonder that the BCCI, in its role as the game’s primary paymaster, is seeking a greater say in the running of the game, and that fellow ICC members are enabling this via a series a clumsily constructed compromises.

It is a long list but to provide just a few examples, take the ratification of a dedicated international window for the IPL to enable the cream of world cricket to participate, the recent shenanigans surrounding the election of Laxman Sivaramakrishnan to the ICC players committee, and of course the compromise around the use of DRS in the game.

This is perhaps the way of capitalism and certainly the impact of the BCCI has not been all bad. In fact, in some ways it has been transformative, as the vast revenues and popularised formats it has brought have allowed the game to expand and take root in more countries than ever before, and allowed the Boards of full member countries to invest heavily in infrastructure and promotion of the sport to the next generation in a sports market more competitive and cluttered than at any time in history.

It has also, via the IPL and the other domestic T20 competitions it has spawned, enabled significantly improved remuneration for the players who provide the ‘content’ upon which so much of this commercial success is based as well as broadening the number of players that can benefit.

However, unlike Packer’s revolution, it has allowed players to access such financial riches without the need of national selection or the attaining of a limited number of overseas professional spots on a county roster. It has allowed players such as Chris Gayle to dictate terms of selection to his own Board, picking and choosing the international matches he can fit into his minstrel like wanderings across T20 tournaments around the globe, and leaving his impoverished Board little choice but to acquiesce lest they lose his services forever.

Left unchecked such situations could grow with unintended consequences for the fabric, traditions and history of the game. Then again, perhaps such concern is unfounded

Certainly at the time and for some years following, there was considerable opposition to Packer’s revolution and much fear of the impact it would have upon the game. The passing of time and perspective has perhaps allowed us to see that it provided much enhancement and that many of the horrors foreseen did not in the end eventuate.

Perhaps in the fullness of time we might see the current debates and issues arising from the way the BCCI is changing aspects of the cricketing landscape and its power base in a similar way ?

Of course we may not, but I do know that in such changing times, Cardus remains forever correct – in cricket ‘crowds’ matter.

Until next time … that is stumps.